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Abstract 
 
In this article, we highlight the importance of psychoanalysis and the 
Heideggerian concept of ‘place’ for each respective domain of inquiry. In 
particular, the writings of Jung and Lacan can unconceal and reveal new 
dimensions of Jeff Malpas’s work on place. Alternatively, Malpas can extend 
the work of these psychoanalysts by showing new dimensions of their ideas 
through an analysis of ‘place’. Ultimately, this article sets up a number of 
possibilities for future research through this novel interaction and 
engagement between the philosophy of place and psychoanalysis. One of 
these possibilities is in genomics and genetic determinism, which we briefly 
acknowledge throughout. 
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Introduction 
For humans, the influence of ‘place’ is profound. As 
Marcia Cavell has rightly pointed out, “Philosophy itself begins 
in the only place it can, here, in the midst of things” (Cavell 
1996, 41). Many eminent philosophers have considered the 
concepts of space and place. Aristotle noted that, “the place of a 
thing is the innermost motionless boundary of what contains it” 
(Aristotle in Barnes 2014, 361). Sigmund Freud identified place 
as the second of three forces that are a constant threat to 
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humans (Freud 1930, 77). Einstein focused on the definitional 
uncertainty of words like space and place (Einstein 1993, xiv). 
More recently John Agnew has reminded us that when thinking 
about place we must take definitional care. He argued that 
place can be a location, or series of locales or as ‘sense of place’ 
where place is grounded in social-spacial imaginations 
reflecting visions or fantasies of located connection that are 
fundamental to understanding knowledge production and 
dissemination (Agnew 2011). Jeff Malpas connects an 
understanding of place to Martin Heidegger. Malpas argues, 
“The idea of place-of topos-runs through the thinking of Martin 
Heidegger almost from the very start” (Malpas 2012, 1). The 
importance of this is highlighted when he says, “it is impossible 
to think with Heidegger unless one attunes oneself to 
Heidegger’s own attunement to place.” (ibid.) Malpas 
emphatically claims, “Indeed, I would argue that Heidegger’s 
work provides us with perhaps the most important and 
sustained inquiry into place to be found in the history of 
Western thought” (Malpas 2008, 3). Throughout this article, we 
will demonstrate that a Heideggerian understanding of place 
can provide a deeper understanding of the ideas of both Jung 
and Lacan. Additional connections can be made to the work of 
Nietzsche and Saussure, as well as other aforementioned 
scholars, which shows the expansive reach that ‘place’, has for a 
number of influential philosophers. Importantly, this deeper 
understanding has broad practical relevance to applied ethics 
and philosophical analysis across a range of areas including in 
other modes of psychotherapy, generic mental health care, 
Indigenous health, rural health as well as to genomics and 
genetic determinism (Crowden 2016). 
Psychoanalysis and the goal to enlarge choices by 
enhancing knowledge of self, of others, the world about us, as 
well as increasing skills in dealing with persons and things 
holds a special place in the history of humankind. Attempts to 
restore or enhance individual psychological well-being and 
autonomy are important. Psychoanalysis and place are 
intrinsically connected.  Both the aims of Jungian and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis can be informed by an understanding or 
restoration of place. As a result, the foreclosure of ‘place’ is one 
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way to explain ‘the return of the repressed’ or “the return of the 
living dead” (Gildersleeve 2018, 175). Essentially what we 
argue is that the foreclosure of place creates the obstructiveness 
of a complex and the experience of ‘not-being-at-home-in-the-
world’ (Gildersleeve 2017, 2) and the aims of Jungian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis can be understood to change this so 
the analysand can “‘return’ to place — as a homecoming” 
(Malpas 2012, 19). Ultimately, this can bring about a “changed 
conception of both our usual ways of thinking about philosophy, 
about ourselves, and about our own experience of involvement 
in the world” (Malpas 2012, 4). Therefore, psychoanalysis 
allows a broadening of an analysand’s horizon to place because 
place is “a structure that resists any reductive analysis.” (ibid.) 
Psychoanalysis can initiate the analysand into thinking about 
place but “It is an exploration that can never be complete, but 
always and only proceeds through the following of particular 
pathways that follow particular directions and move through 
particular landscapes. Recognizing the topological character of 
such thinking gives an added significance to Heidegger’s 
insistence on his own thinking (and genuine thinking as such) 
as always ‘on the way’.” (ibid.) Furthermore, the analysand’s, or 
indeed anyone’s, discovery of place as well as it being accepted 
philosophically requires “a willingness on the part of the reader 
to participate in that exploration, and in the peregrinations 
that make it up.” (ibid.) 
What is essential to highlight is a recognition that place 
is “constituted through an essential mutuality of relation at 
every level, and that is unitary even while it also contains an 
essential multiplicity.” (ibid.) Therefore, what Jungian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis offer the analysand is an opportunity 
to “find their unity not in any single preexisting element in that 
place from which the unity of the whole derives, but rather in 
the way in which the multiple elements of the place are 
gathered together in their mutual relatedness to one another” 
(Malpas 2012, 18). Malpas highlights an example from 
Heidegger’s writing to elucidate place when he says:  
 
“Thus, in Heidegger’s example in ‘Building Dwelling Thinking,’ 
the bridge appears as a bridge not through the exercise of its own 
qualities indetermining an otherwise featureless terrain, but 
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through a coming to appearance in which bridge, river, and the 
entirety of the countryside around it are gathered together as one 
and as many, and are thereby determined, in their being, as 
bridge, as river, as countryside. It is this essential gathering of 
elements in a mutual belonging together in which they come to 
presence that Heidegger also describes as the Ereignis — an 
event that is to be understood not as purely temporal, but as the 
temporalizing of space and the spatializing of time in the single 
gatheredness of place.” (ibid.) 
 
An important theme of this quote is what Heidegger 
calls ‘gathering’. Our article will demonstrate that ‘gathering’ is 
essential to both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis because 
it reveals the ‘place’ of the analysand through the Ereignis (or 
Jung’s transcendent function). This is a ‘moment’ when the 
analysand discovers the Self (Jung) or Subject (Lacan) 
(Gildersleeve 2017, 3; Gildersleeve 2018, 176) by uncovering the 
meaning of their ‘place’ for being-in-the-world. With this 
unconcealment of place, Dasein (being-there) is also revealed 
(Gildersleeve 2016a, 22) and “This place is one that is 
constantly before us, in which we are always situated, and yet 
from which we often seem estranged” (Malpas 2012, 14). Thus, 
both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis can be understood 
as removing this estrangement to discover the analysand’s 
authentic place in the world and history. Jung appears to have 
achieved this in his own life: “At times I feel as if I am spread 
out over the landscape and inside things, and am myself living 
in every tree, in the plashing of the waves, in the clouds and 
the animals that come and go, in the procession of the seasons. 
There is nothing in the Tower that has not grown into its own 
form over the decades, nothing with which I am not linked” 
(Jung 1961, 225). 
What will become clear and what we argue, is that place 
is uncovered when the analysand opens up the space of the 
desire of the Other (this is where Lacan is important) which is 
reflected in the words of Malpas when he says “a place is 
precisely that which opens up to allow room for what belongs 
within it. The return to place is thus the turning toward that 
which allows for, that which gives room, but also that which 
withdraws” (Malpas 2012, 19). Psychoanalysis helps the 
analysand toward this goal and this is where the barred subject 
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or Self is discovered through the Other. Put differently, this is 
when the analysand ‘lets the Other be’ (Gildersleeve 2017, 21) 
by ‘allowing for, giving room and withdrawing’ from the space of 
the desire of the Other. This is a negative movement where the 
analysand discovers the impossibility of their desire and 
therefore reveals the ‘barred subject’. On the other hand, the 
impossibility of the analysand’s desire is revealed through the 
positive ‘thrown’ possibilities the Other has received from their 
‘place’ in the world. Succinctly put, what Lacanian 
psychoanalysis aims to achieve is for the analysand to traverse 
their fantasies to uncover this authentic situation or ‘place’ 
between the barred subject and the Other, rather that covering 
it over by ‘misrecognising’ place. Jung and Lacan are brought 
together in the same way Malpas talks about Heidegger’s work 
being brought together through place when he says, “all of 
Heidegger’s thinking itself turns around the single question of 
place, and in which, in this place, all of the other elements in 
his thinking are brought together” (Malpas 2012, 37). Here we 
detail this notion further in relation to Jung and Lacan.  
 
1. Remembering and Turning  
In this section we aim to clarify how the intrinsic 
foundations of Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis are built 
implicitly on the phenomenon of ‘place’. Both of these 
psychoanalytic frameworks aim to promote “remembering that 
is itself invoked in Heidegger’s characterization of philosophy 
as marked by forgetting” (Malpas 2012, 20). Both Jungian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis aim at remembering to surpass “a 
forgetting, not only of finitude and questionability, but of 
place.” (ibid.) Questionability and discovering finitude (the 
impossibility of the barred subject) (Gildersleeve 2016a, 16) are 
both intimately related to the analysand’s success of uncovering 
and remembering ‘place’.  This remembering or “return at issue 
here is not, however, a return that is predicated on a genuine 
moving away from – if that were the case there could be no 
possibility of return at all. Instead, the return is a ‘turning 
back’ to that in which we already find ourselves (a turning 
back, in one sense, to our very placedness)” (Malpas 2012, 19). 
This remembering overcomes misrecognition and is another 
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way of saying ‘making oneself seen’, shifting from desire to 
drive (see Gildersleeve 2017) or “truth emerges out of failure, in 
which failure makes itself an immanent constituent of truth” 
(Zizek 2014, 89). 
Place can remain unconscious or ‘misrecognised’ 
(Gildersleeve 2016a, 8) if the analysand does not follow the 
ethics of Lacanian psychoanalysis to act in “conformity with the 
desire that is in you” (Lacan 1992, 314) to unify their desire 
with the desire of the Other through Jung’s transcendent 
function (Gildersleeve 2018, 183). When the analysand achieves 
this; place is experienced where “It is like the movement in 
which, having been engrossed in some activity, we look up to 
see the place that has been around us all the time, and that has 
also enabled and supported the activity in which we have been 
engrossed” (Malpas 2012, 19).  We argue the ambitions of 
Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis are to achieve this as “a 
turning or a coming back to place, or to a place, in a way that 
also brings that place itself into view. It is an occurrence that is 
mirrored in Heidegger’s own image of the “clearing” (Lichtung) 
that allows the emergence of things into presence.” (ibid.) 
Malpas states, this “movement back to place – back to that 
which otherwise remains unnoticed and unremarked (as place 
itself often remains in the background of our activities) – can 
also be understood as a movement of recollection, of 
remembering again, and Heidegger draws directly on this idea 
alongside that of return or homecoming.” (ibid.) This 
homecoming is in contrast to ‘not-being-at-home’, which occurs 
when an analysand has not removed an obstructive complex 
from being-in-the-world (Gildersleeve 2016d, 967). What this 
means is that removing an obstructive complex leads the 
analysand toward a ‘turning’ or ‘homecoming’ to place. To 
remove this obstructiveness of a complex is to see that “The 
historical is thus not opposed to the topological, but 
encompassed by it. The history of being is itself a history of 
place” (Malpas 2012, 35). In other words, removing a complex 
requires the analysand to understand authentically their 
thrown ‘place’ in history.  If the analysand was to not discover 
their ‘place’ in history this would lead to “the ending of history” 
which “is to be found in the nihilism of the almost complete 
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forgetting of being that is also a forgetting of place”1 (ibid.). As 
will become clear as this article progresses “Place cannot be 
other than what is given in the multiplicity of places – to 
suppose otherwise would be to envisage the possibility of place, 
topos, as itself atopic” (Malpas 2012, 49). If the analysand does 
not recognise the importance of the multiplicity of places for the 
turning to homecoming, an atopic understanding of place will 
lead to the analysand experiencing obstructive being-in-the-
world as an estrangement and alienation from place. 
Looking into this further reveals that the transcendent 
function (Jung) or traversing the fantasy to uncover the barred 
subject (Lacan) (Gildersleeve 2017, 11) “is a turning back to 
place, [and] it is also more immediately understood in the 
Heideggerian context as a turning back (in the sense of a 
returning or reorienting) to being” (Malpas 2012, 36). In other 
words, these actions of psychoanalysis lead the analysand to 
reveal a truth of Being through a discovery of their place in the 
world and history. Both Jungian and Lacan psychoanalysis 
allow the analysand to achieve “a turning back into the place in 
which we already find ourselves” (Malpas 2012, 37). The 
analysand achieves this by discovering their relation to the 
Other/s which is “a structure that is constituted through the 
mutual interplay of multiple elements, a structure that 
encompasses the entities and elements that appear within it 
rather than underlying them, a structure to which belongs a 
unity that is given only in and through the mutual relatedness 
of the elements that make it up” (Malpas 2012, 40). These 
elements are the analysand’s multiple relationships with 
Others, more specifically, the analysand’s desire in relation to 
the desire of the Other/s. Essentially we argue this is a major 
focus of both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis; to reveal 
the structure of the analysand’s place within the world and 
history by developing their understanding of the relationship of 
their desire to the desire of the Other or Others. What is 
important to understand is that the structure of the 
analysand’s place “is a certain definite region, bounded and yet 
also thereby gathered, in which we and the things around us 
are given together” (Malpas 2012, 45). Furthermore, this 
discovery of place does not only occur once because “The 
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gathering of place that is the happening of presence and of 
world is a constant and multiple occurrence rather than a 
single founding or positing” (Malpas 2012, 38). This is 
consistent with a Lacanian understanding of hysteria with 
Nietzsche’s Will to Power (Gildersleeve 2016b). As a result, 
both Nietzsche’s Will to Power and Lacanian hysteria can be 
understood further by connecting them to place. 
 
2. Nihilism and Homelessness 
Malpas highlights that “We may become estranged 
from place, we may forget or cover over our essential 
placedness, but these are all forms of concealing, disguising, or 
denying a relatedness to place that nevertheless perdures” 
(Malpas 2012, 63). Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis 
combined with Malpas and Heidegger can be understood as 
aiming to reveal or unconceal this place that perdures to 
remove the analyand’s estrangement from place. Malpas 
indicates, “under the reign of technological modernity, our 
relatedness to place is not obliterated, but is rather covered 
over, ignored, made invisible.” (ibid.) Importantly, in reaction 
to this covering, Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis as well 
as Heidegger’s philosophy can mount a “critique of the 
placelessness of modernity – such a critique depends on the 
contradiction, within modernity itself, between its refusal of 
place (a refusal that refuses to recognize itself as a refusal) 
and its own inescapable placidness.” (ibid.) Here modernity 
itself can be compared to an analysand who is estranged from 
and has covered their place in the world and history. 
The forgetting of place is “The nihilism of modernity” 
(Malpas 2012, 98). In other words, nihilism results from “a 
denial of the very topos in which thinking itself comes to pass” 
(Malpas 2012, 97) and therefore nihilism with affect (through 
the obstructiveness of existence) the analysand who denies or 
covers their place in the world and history. To surpass this 
nihilism “it is only in the direction of the thinking of topos, itself 
an essential form of questioning – of holding open a free-play of 
possibility (a ‘play-space’) – that any proper response to the 
overpowering movement of nihilism can be found” (Malpas 
2012, 111). This questioning is depicted in Jung’s interpretation 
Matthew Gildersleeve & Andrew Crowden / Place and Psychoanalysis 
85 
 
 
of the 10 woodcuts of the Rosarium Philosophorum as well as in 
Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Gildersleeve 2016c). 
Malpas also recognises a connection between Nietzsche and 
place when he claims “Nietzsche’s preoccupation with the need 
to find a location attuned not only to his physical but also to his 
mental and spiritual needs. Here is a thinker who is far from 
being detached from his surroundings but whose very capacity 
for thought depends on them. Scattered throughout his 
writings, one finds comments concerning the relation between 
his work, his state of mind, and the places in which he resides, 
as well as descriptions, positive and negative, of those places” 
(Malpas 2015b, 195). 
Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis assists an 
analysand in “the form of a returning to place, a refinding of 
oneself, a reorientation (even, perhaps, a repositioning) – as 
Heidegger himself refers to it, a form of homecoming, although 
a coming-home to that from which we never really departed” 
(Malpas 2012, 111). When the analysand does not reveal their 
place they experience an obstructive complex (Gildersleeve 
2016c, 90) indicative of “Homelessness… consists in the 
abandonment of beings by being. Homelessness is the symptom 
of oblivion of being” (Gildersleeve 2016c, 154). Jungian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis assists the analysand “back to that 
place in which we always already are, but from which we are so 
often turned away, and which modernity threatens to hide 
almost completely” (Malpas 2014a, 21). Malpas explains “The 
need for the recovery of place, for a return home, arises, then, 
only because of the way in which our very being ‘out of place’ is 
itself a failure to grasp our being already ‘in place’” (Malpas 
2008, 309) which occurs when the analysand has not discovered 
the Self or barred subject. Both Jungian and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis implicitly understand that “We dwell, and yet 
we do not dwell; we belong to being, and yet are separated from 
being; we are in place, and yet we find ourselves displaced; we 
are at home, and yet nevertheless remain homeless.” (ibid.) As 
a result, both theoretical orientations aim toward a 
“‘homecoming’ of which Heidegger speaks is a return to the 
nearness of being” (ibid.), the barred subject or Self. Malpas also 
shows that Heidegger identified an error of the philosophical 
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“tradition as having largely overlooked such ‘situatedness’” 
(Malpas 2008, 39) of place. Correcting this error is important to 
prevent the analysand’s ‘homelessness’ and “On this basis the 
central questions of philosophy, questions of being and 
existence, as well as of ethics and virtue, must themselves take 
their determination and their starting point from this same 
place.” (ibid.) 
 
3. Boundaries and Multiplicity 
What we aim to show in this section is that for Jung and 
Lacan and “Fundamental to the idea of place, and so to the idea 
of philosophical topography, is the notion of bound or limit” 
(Malpas 2014c, 14). The notion of bound or limit is essential to 
both Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis as well as place. 
Boundary and limit are essential to Jung’s transcendent 
function as well as discovering the barred subject in Lacanian 
psychoanalysis (Gildersleeve 2017, 3). This combination of 
discovering the barred subject through the transcendent 
function is how an analysand surpasses an obstructive complex 
and this highlights that “The idea of bound or limit that 
appears here is one that takes bound or limit to be essentially 
productive, rather than merely restrictive. As Heidegger 
famously puts it ‘a boundary is not that at which something 
stops but… that from which something begins its presencing’” 
(Malpas 2014c, 14). This boundary, loss, impossibility or limit 
discloses the place of the barred subject of the analysand and 
allows them to traverse their fantasy to remove the 
obstructiveness of their complex from being in the world with 
Jung’s transcendent function (Gildersleeve 2017, 3). The 
transcendent function takes place when the analysand unifies 
their desire (conscious) with the desire of the Other 
(unconscious) through the drive (Gildersleeve 2017, 9). When 
this occurs, this reveals the boundary, impossibility or limit of 
the barred subject through the possibilities or boundaries of the 
desire of the Other/s. This is how the analysand goes beyond 
their imaginary fantasies to find their place in the world by 
discovering ‘the impossible’ (the possibility of the impossibility 
of their desire) (Gildersleeve 2017, 23) which equates to Lacan’s 
formula “the real as the impossible” (Lacan 1998, 167). Since 
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the analysand has removed their imaginary fantasies by 
discovering the impossibility of their desire, their complex no 
longer obstructs their world because they have found a more 
authentic or Real ‘place’ in the world. When this occurs through 
the drive/transcendent function, the analysand reaches the 
‘place’ of Gelassenheit, which is an “experience of letting go, 
being let, and letting be” (Gildersleeve 2017, 20). This is when 
the limit or boundary of the barred subject/Self is revealed to the 
analysand; this is elucidated by Heidegger when he says, “the 
boundary, in the Greek sense, does not block off but, rather, as 
itself something brought forth, first brings what is present to 
radiance” (Malpas 2012, 101). This radiance of the boundary of 
the barred subject/Jungian Self is ‘the event’ or ‘Augenblick’, 
which we will discuss in a later section of this paper. 
Another important aspect to detail is the “complexity of 
place. This complexity is evident in the ‘folded’ character of 
place” (Malpas 2012, 49). In Jungian and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis, the analysand needs to come to an 
understanding that “any place encompasses other places within 
it while also being encompassed by other places in its turn.” 
(ibid.) For the analysand to discover the place of the Self or 
barred subject they must appreciate that place is always “a 
manifold of places [that are] reciprocally related by belonging 
together, which we call a settlement or a district [Ortschaft]. 
That ‘place’ in which the essence of Being comes to presence in 
an eminent sense” (Malpas 2012, 154). In other words, when 
the analysand discovers the manifold of places reciprocally 
related together they are able to turn toward their homecoming 
to remove the obstructiveness of their complexes and imaginary 
fantasies. This understanding of place is important because 
“Rather than presenting human beings as deterministically 
constrained, such a conception opens up a view of the human as 
enmeshed in an essentially reciprocal relation with the world in 
which it is also situated. The human thus cannot be assumed in 
advance, nor can it be taken to arise out of only one set of 
structures or elements alone” (Malpas 2012, 156). As a result, 
the analysand needs to understand their “reciprocal relation 
with the world” to achieve their homecoming rather than 
understanding themselves as isolated from others. This also 
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highlights the idea that place and the foundations of Jungian 
and Lacanian psychoanalysis are important instruments to 
understand the ethics of genomic futures and in particular 
criticize the philosophy of ‘genetic determinism’ (e.g. see Dar-
Nimrod & Heine 2011, Kirby 2000, Gilbert 2002, Crowden 2016). 
To reiterate, Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis 
enable “a return to our own experience of being, and one might 
say, our own experience of ourselves. It is also, it should be 
said, a remembering of place” (Malpas 2012, 173). In other 
words, psychoanalysis assists the analysand to “that open 
realm in which self, other selves, and things first come to 
presence” (ibid., 197). This occurs when a “multiplicity of 
elements is gathered” (ibid., 202) by the analysand by going 
beyond an imaginary relationship to themselves and the Other 
(Gildersleeve 2018). This happens through Jung’s transcendent 
function, which unifies the analysand’s desire with the desire of 
the Other to disclose each other’s ‘place’ in the world. Jung’s 
transcendent function discloses the possibilities of the 
analysand and the Other but also their impossibilities 
(Gildersleeve 2017, 13) which is “a certain boundedness, but it 
is a boundedness that opens up rather than closes off” (Malpas 
2012, 202). This boundedness is the structure of the Self or 
barred subject and this is what allows the analysand to remove 
the obstructiveness of their complex to find their place, freedom 
(Gildersleeve 2017, 7-8) and homecoming in the world. To 
summarize, the ‘place’ of the barred subject or Self is disclosed 
by Lacanian and Jungian psychoanalysis through “a unitary 
structure that is constituted in terms of a multiplicity of 
irreducible elements; a structure that is bounded and yet open” 
(ibid., 203). 
 
4. Mapping Out, Topography and Poetry 
As we have been claiming throughout this article, 
Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis shift an analysand from 
error (misrecognition) to a truth (Gildersleeve 2017, 16) in an 
“attempt to illuminate a place in which we already find 
ourselves and in which other things are also disclosed to us” 
(Malpas 2008, 34). This can be detailed further by noting that 
the processes developed by these psychoanalysts “bears 
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comparison with the idea of the writing or ‘inscribing’ of place 
that is undertaken by the traditional topographer. The 
topographer who is concerned to map out a particular region.” 
(ibid.) The analysand needs to map out their place in the world 
in connection to the Other to discover the Self or barred subject 
to remove an obstructive complex or fantasy from being in the 
world.  The analysand like a topographer “has the task of 
mapping out that region while located within it. Such a task 
can only be accomplished by looking to the interconnections 
among the features of that region and through a process of 
repeated triangulation and traverse-and a good deal of walking-
on the basis of which such interconnections are established.” 
(ibid.) In other words, the analysand discovers their place in the 
world by understanding their interconnection to others through 
the transcendent function like that depicted in the 10 woodcuts 
of the Rosarium Philosophorum and Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra (Gildersleeve 2016c). The analysand achieves this 
by acting in conformity with their desire (through introversion) 
until they discover their boundary or limit through the desire of 
the Other (extroversion) (Gildersleeve 2018, 176). The 
analysand discovers their interconnections with others through 
this process of acting in conformity with their desire until they 
experience the obstructiveness of their complex through the 
desire of the Other. When this happens, the analysand can 
come to a deeper understanding of their place by discovering 
the impossibility of their desire through the desire of the Other, 
which reveals the barred subject or Self to the analysand. Once 
this has been achieved the analysand can traverse their fantasy 
by understanding the impossibility of their desire which allows 
the obstructiveness of a complex to surpassed (Gildersleeve 
2016a, 14-16). When this happens, the analysand has a deeper 
understanding of their authentic ‘place’ in the world 
(Gildersleeve 2018, 199) by understanding their 
interconnectedness to Others through “the crisscrossing 
pathways that represent the topographer’s travels through the 
landscape” (Malpas 2008, 34). This analogy is very important 
because it “suggests that it is a mistake to look for simple, 
reductive accounts-whether we are exploring a concept, or 
problem, or the meaning of a term, the point is always to look to 
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a larger field of relations in which the matter at issue can be 
placed” (ibid., 35). This again highlights the errors of genetic 
determinism and psychotherapies that do not conceptualise the 
human being as having a ‘place’ in the world and history 
through their interconnections with Others. 
Similar to the topographer, the analysand must unify 
introversion with extroversion (Gildersleeve 2018, 167) to map 
out and come “to understand a place, and so to grasp the more 
particular localities and places situated within it, through 
walking around and getting used to the various pathways and 
sites that make it up” (Malpas 2012, 203). In other words, this 
is the analysand’s journey to ‘act in conformity with their 
desire’ (Lacan 1992 314) through introversion to discover if that 
desire is possible or impossible by discovering the desire of the 
Other through extroversion (Gildersleeve 2018). This is how the 
analysand maps out their place in the world and history 
“through repeated triangulation and traverse across the face of 
that terrain” (Malpas 2012, 203) which is guided by the 
obstructions of their complexes they experience along the way. 
In contrast to those who argue for genetic determinism 
(Dar-Nimrod & Heine 2011, 22; Gilbert 2002, 123), the 
analysand’s unobstructed freedom and place in the world is not 
“a matter of finding just one point from which everything else 
falls into view. The elements within the landscape provide the 
focus through which the unity of the landscape is grasped” 
(Malpas 2012, 203). Malpas ardently states that place is 
discovered through “a multiplicity of elements that are focused 
and gathered together” and place “is to be located within a 
unitary but differentiated ‘region,’ each element of which is 
interconnected and mutually defining” (Malpas 1999a, 133). 
This differentiation comes from the differences between the 
analysand and the Other. The analysand and Other are 
interconnected and their place is mutually defined by the 
‘thrown’ possibilities and impossibilities of their desires. As a 
result, the analysand’s discovery of place “is to encounter 
oneself only inasmuch as one also encounters others, and 
inasmuch as one also encounters things.” (ibid.) The 
analysand’s discovery of place “is always a ‘there’ belonging to 
the many rather than the one – a ‘there’ that must be always 
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multiple and never single in any simple fashion – and so also as 
the place in which being, that is, the nearness of the presence of 
things, also comes to light” (Malpas 2007, 495). This is why 
introversion combined with extroversion is necessary to 
discover place (see Gildersleeve 2018). 
Finally, Malpas brings attention the relationship 
between place and the poetry of T.S. Eliot. He suggests, 
“Perhaps Four Quartets can be seen as an example of what 
Heidegger would call ‘the poetry that thinks,’ and so perhaps 
Eliot can be seen, in a certain way, as moving in the direction of 
his own topology of being” (Malpas 2012, 267). He adds, “In his 
juxtaposition of end and beginning, Eliot also gives added 
emphasis to the image of turning and return that is so central 
to the thinking of topos.” (ibid.) Malpas quotes Eliot’s Four 
Quartets: “What we call the beginning is often the end/And to 
make an end is to make a beginning” as well as “We shall not 
cease from exploration/And the end of all our exploring/Will be 
to arrive where we started/And know the place for the first 
time.” (ibid.) This connection between beginning, end and place 
is also found in Sartre as a change in a ‘fundamental project’ 
(see Gildersleeve 2017, 12). 
 
5. Gathering and the Other 
The task for the analysand for both Jungian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis “is never a matter simply of the 
coming to presence of a single being-as if presence was 
something that could attach to a single self-sufficient entity. 
The presencing or disclosedness of a being is always a matter of 
its coming to presence in relation to other beings” (Malpas 
2008, 14). Jung’s transcendent function and Lacan’s traversing 
the fantasy is only possible when the barred subject or Self of 
the analysand comes “to presence in relation to other beings” 
(the Other/s). This occurs because the analysand comes to 
understand a “gathering of otherwise multiple elements in a 
single unity” (ibid., 16). This gathering of place is structured 
through the analysand’s desire (introversion) in relation to the 
desire of the Other/s (extroversion). This also emphasizes the 
importance of the analysand’s balance between introversion 
and extroversion and this is how the analysand appropriates 
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their place in the world and history in ‘the moment’ 
(Gildersleeve 2016c, 102) “in which we find ourselves along 
with other persons and things” (Malpas 2008, 221). The 
analysand reveals their place in this moment through the 
barred subject or their boundaries by discovering the 
possibilities and impossibilities of their desire. Place involves a 
gathering of the “interrelations between the originary and 
mutually dependent (‘equiprimordial’) elements” (ibid., 306). As 
a result, the analysand’s task of understanding their place in 
the world is never complete and understanding their 
relationship to others can always be developed through more 
gathering (this will be detailed in the penultimate section of 
this article)2. This elucidates Malpas when he states, “idea of 
boundedness and that of focus or gathering are themselves 
closely tied to a conception of place as constituted through a 
gathering of elements that are themselves mutually defined 
only through the way in which they are gathered together 
within the place they also constitute” (ibid., 29). This is 
important because it highlights that the analysand will only be 
‘at home in the world’ if they are able to discover their place, 
which is mutually, defined in relation to the desire of the 
Other/s. Again, this shows the errors of genetic determinism 
that excludes an analysand’s relationship to others by focusing 
solely on the genetic makeup of the individual as “separate and 
autonomous entities” (Malpas 2011, 49). Supporters of genetic 
determinism do not recognise “that we cannot understand 
ourselves independently of the places in which our lives unfold 
even though those places may be complex and multiple” 
(Malpas 2014a, 22). Haslam eloquently describes the 
problematic consequences of genetic determinism when he 
notes this “thinking has an insidious tendency to deepen 
divisions among human groups, creating a view of the social 
world as collection of fixed and segregated categories” (Haslam 
2011, 822). What we aim to show is that both place and 
psychoanalysis provide a way out of this nihilism. 
The analysand’s place is arranged in “both a being 
gathered into as well as a differentiating from” (Malpas 2014a, 
22) the desire of the Other/s. This is how the analysand 
‘gathers’ an understanding of their place by unifying their 
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desire with the desire of the Other/s to establish their “identity 
through differentiation” (Malpas 2016, 7). When supporters of 
genetic determinism isolate the individual from their 
relationship with others both place and “identity through 
differentiation” is lost and misrecognised which can contribute 
to an ideology that is similar to one that condones an 
analysand’s imaginary fantasies and obstructive complexes. In 
other words, “while one can take the thing at issue at a certain 
‘instant’ and then analyze or dissect it into its apparently 
separate elements, treating each as if it had an identity of its 
own, any such analysis is always somewhat artificial” (Malpas 
2008, 59).  
 
6. Reciprocal Determination and Language 
The analysand’s unobstructed place in the world and 
history stands “within a dense web of relations – through those 
relations it gives shape and focus to other things, but in doing 
so it also gives shape and focus to itself” (Malpas 2016, 8). The 
analysand discloses their place “through the interrelating of the 
elements that already belong to the situation” (Malpas 2008, 
59) of their desire. The possibility or impossibility of the 
analysand’s desire is determined by the possibility or 
impossibility of the desire of the Other resulting in “the 
reciprocal determination of elements.” (ibid.) The analysand’s 
identity and place in the world “is given only in and through the 
ongoing and reciprocal determination of the elements of which 
it is constituted” (ibid., 60). Because the “identity and unity is 
thus not to be found at any statically conceived ‘instant’ in that 
constitution” (ibid.), the analysand needs to always be open to 
more ‘gathering’ to be unobstructed by complexes and to find 
their authentic place in the world (for more, see footnote on 
previous page). 
The analysand’s understanding of place is similar to the 
hermeneutic circle where “the elements that make up a text can 
only be understood in relation to the unity of the text as a 
whole, while the unity of the text is only to be understood in 
terms of the elements that contribute to that unity.” (ibid.) This 
again highlights the importance of non-reductionism and 
extroversion so the analysand can discover their place through 
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the desire of the Other/s. This is also supported by “Heidegger’s 
account of being-there as always social of being-there as always 
‘being-with’ [which] indicates the way in which Heidegger takes 
issue with the predominantly solipsistic underpinning of many 
traditional ways of thinking of human being-especially those 
ways of understanding that are taken to have their origins in 
the internally centered thinking exemplified in Descartes’s 
Meditations” (ibid., 89). This reductive solipsism is still 
prevalent in genetic determinism, which “reduces the self to a 
molecular entity, equating human beings, in all their social, 
historical, and moral complexity, with their genes” (Parrott 
et.al. 2012, 763). 
In contrast, Jung’s transcendent function is a “unifying 
occurrence in which differentiation is also evident” (Malpas 
2008, 116) where the analysand removes their obstructive 
complex by discovering the possibilities and impossibilities of 
their desire and the desire of the Other. Place and 
psychoanalysis are developed by noting that they “stand in an 
important and essential relation to language. This is so in at 
least two respects: first in the character of place and language 
as ‘gathering,’ and, second, in the character of language and 
space as both ‘differentiating’ or ‘dif-fering’” (Malpas 2012, 263). 
It is vital to point out the relation to Saussurean linguistics 
here. Place, the barred subject and the Self have an essential 
relation to Saussurean linguistics since they all share the 
characteristic of being “purely differential and defined not by 
their positive content but negatively by their relations with the 
other terms of the system. Their most precise characteristic is 
in being what the others are not.” (Saussure 1959, 117) 
Furthermore, place, the barred subject and the Self like 
“Language is a system of interdependent terms in which the 
value of each term results solely from the simultaneous 
presence of the others” (ibid., 114). Lastly, Saussure’s 
linguistics can critique genetic determinism by recognising that 
“The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less 
importance than the other signs that surround it. Proof of this 
is that the value of a term may be modified without either its 
meaning or its sound being affected, solely because a 
neighboring term has been modified.” (ibid., 120) The 
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analysand’s place in the world is discovered through “a 
gathered unity in which things find themselves brought 
together with one another while they are also disclosed in their 
difference-‘language’ is a key word that names this happening 
of unifying and differing” (Malpas 2008, 264). Jungian and 
Lacanian psychoanalysis helps the analysand “allow the world, 
and the things that make up the world to come forth in their 
abundance and multiplicity.” (ibid., 271) As a result, in contrast 
to genetic determinism or reductive psychotherapies that 
eliminates place, the analysand’s “identity is never just a 
matter of the self-sameness of the thing, but always directs us 
towards the thing in its relationality” (Malpas 2014a, 19). The 
analysand discovers their place in the world and history 
through the desire of the Other/s which is “a difference that 
itself arises only in and through an essential relatedness. It is 
this event of gathering - which is also a belonging, a unifying, 
and a differentiating” (ibid.) and this is what we believe both 
Jungian and Lacanian psychoanalysis aim toward. 
 
7. Homecoming, Reorientation and Ereignis 
We claim the analysand visits the psychoanalyst 
because of their ontological ‘homelessness’ in the world. They 
experience this homelessness because they have ‘forgotten’ or 
misrecognised their place in the world and this results in the 
obstructiveness of a complex. The job of psychoanalysis is to 
change this through a “reversal of forgetting [which] is also a 
turning back to our proper place-and it is in just this sense that 
Heidegger will frequently, in his later writing, call upon the 
idea of the reversal of forgetfulness as a matter of ‘homecoming’ 
(Heimkunft)” (Malpas 2008, 149). Thus, psychoanalysis is a 
form of ‘transhumanism’ because it promotes a “returning to 
this dwelling-place, the place in which we already are and yet 
are not, that we come into the ‘being-there’ that belongs to our 
‘future humanness’.” (ibid., 180) 
When the analysand discovers the barred subject or Self, 
a turning to their place in the world/history occurs, but “this 
turning is not a change in standpoint, but rather what might be 
thought of as a ‘reorientation’ that enables the proper 
recognition of the place, the locality, in which thinking already 
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finds itself.” (ibid., 151) This is possible because the analysand 
is no longer obstructed by their complex or fantasies because 
they have gone beyond an imaginary relationship to themselves 
and the Other/s. The analysand can now see their Real place in 
the world more authentically through this ‘event’ or “Ereignis”. 
Malpas explains this by saying “‘Ereignis’ is the idea of ‘coming 
to sight,’ ‘being disclosed,’ ‘being made evident.’ Etymologically 
‘Ereignis’ has its roots in the now somewhat archaic term 
‘eräugnen’ meaning to see or to be evident. Once again this is 
suggestive of a connection back to Being and Time-to the idea of 
the ‘moment of vision,’ Augenblick, in which being-there grasps 
its existential situation.” (ibid., 215) The Augenblick was briefly 
mentioned earlier as the radiance of the boundary from the 
barred subject. As a result, this connection can be retrieved 
here where “‘Ereignis” is the name for the particular sort of 
unifying and differentiating happening by which things come to 
presence, by which they come to be” (ibid., 216) as the 
analysand discovers the place of the barred subject/Self through 
the impossibility of their desire through the desire of the 
Other/s.  In other words, we believe the aim of both Jungian 
and Lacanian psychoanalysis is to achieve this “‘visionary 
moment,’ the ‘Augenblick,’ as that in which being-there grasps 
its ‘Situation,’ the idea of authenticity, can all be seen as 
articulations of aspects of this original understanding of 
situatedness as ‘eventful’)” (ibid., 59). This is “the “other 
beginning” of the turning back to being that occurs in the 
disclosive gathering of belonging that is the Event-a turning in 
which we regain a proper relatedness to the world and 
ourselves, in which we recognize the proper place, and so the 
boundaries, of our dwelling.” (ibid., 299) 
 
8. Triangulation and Psychoanalysis 
Malpas also sees some important connections between 
triangulation and place. For example, “in a terrain that is not 
yet mapped, triangulation, together with movement across the 
terrain, allows the mapping of the terrain through the 
successive triangulation of the different locations within it” 
(Malpas 2014b, 4). This analogy has resonates with Jungian 
and Lacanian psychoanalysis. The success of these 
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psychotherapies depends on the analysand taking the journey 
of triangulation to map out the terrain of their place in the 
world (Cf. Gildersleeve 2016c). This involves the analysand 
‘acting in conformity with their desire’ until they discover the 
unconscious through the impossibility of their desire via the 
desire of the Other. This unconceals the barred subject or Self 
through the unification of opposites (the transcendent function 
– conscious/unconscious, desire/desire of the Other, 
introversion/extroversion). 
The analysand discovers their place in the world 
“through the interconnectedness of the places” (Malpas 2014b, 
4). In other words, their interconnectedness with the desire of 
the Other/s and place is revealed in more depth and detail 
“through repeated sightings and movements across it” (ibid.) 
(see next section for more on this). The meaning of the 
analysand’s place in the world is “an interconnection that can 
never be given all at once, nor in any final or exhaustive fashion 
(no mapping is ever complete)” (Malpas 2014b, 6; Gildersleeve 
2016b, 6). As a result, the analysand needs to continue 
“repeated tracing out of those connections” (Malpas 2014b, 6; 
Gildersleeve 2016b, 21) to become more authentic and at home 
in an unobstructed world. The analysand’s place is “not given 
independently of other places-for there to be one place is for 
there to be many places, and so places appear always as part of 
a larger topographic or topological field” (Malpas 2014b, 8). 
Finally “Given the dynamic character of triangulation, and so of 
the formation of place and region, the relationality of place and 
region is itself always in process” (ibid.) which is the focus of 
the penultimate section of this article. 
 
9. Hysteria, Will to Power and Place 
We contend that an analysand’s task is to discover their 
“place that is essentially unitary, dynamic, and constantly 
unfolding” (Malpas 2008, 65). The analysand displays 
authenticity by understanding “the structure that appears 
here-whether understood through the Ereignis, the happening 
of place that is the happening of the Fourfold, the 'event' of 
disclosedness that is the event of truth (the 'clearing' – 
Lichtung) – never achieves completion even though there is a 
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sense in which it is always moving towards completion” 
(Malpas 2014b, 12). As the analysand discovers their place in 
the world through the relation of their desire to the desire of 
the Other/s they are “unifying but not unified.” (ibid.) As a 
result, to be authentic to their place in the world the analysand 
requires an understanding “that rejects the idea of a finished 
system” (ibid.)3. The analysand’s “Returning to place is a 
returning to nearness to things, but such nearness is a matter 
of allowing things to be what they are, in their closeness as well 
as their distance, in their unity and differentiation” (Malpas 
2008, 310). The analysand achieves this through introversion to 
act in conformity with their desire until they discover the 
boundaries of their place by traveling to the desire of the 
Other/s through extroversion and this is “why returning to 
place, as Hölderlin makes clear, stands in an essential relation 
to ‘journeying’” (ibid.)4. The analysand metaphorically 
undertakes the ‘journey’ of triangulation by acting in 
conformity with their desire until they discover the desire of the 
Other/s and this is how the analysand can remove their 
obstructive complexes and find their place at home in the world. 
To achieve this, the analysand needs to understand that 
“triangulation has the character of an always unfinished 
process” and “triangulation is a potentially continuous process 
that is brought to an end only temporarily and on the basis of 
more or less arbitrary convention or decision” (Malpas 2014b, 
7). As a result, the analysand’s “Authenticity would thus be 
tied, not to adherence to some determinate inner 'truth', but 
rather to an openness to what Heidegger calls the 'event' of  
appropriation-an openness to the happening of place” (Malpas 
2014a, 22)5. Finally, this means being authentic takes “the form 
of a returning to place that has always to be repeated-a 
returning that is never simply accomplished and completed, a 
returning that never brings us, once and for all, into a fully and 
enduringly-present 'there', a returning that never results in our 
finally and forever finding ourselves simply and unequivocally 
'at home'” (Malpas 2015a, 4). 
 
 
 
Matthew Gildersleeve & Andrew Crowden / Place and Psychoanalysis 
99 
 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion only through the analysand’s “active 
involvement with the landscape” (Malpas 1999b, 40) (i.e. 
involvement with Other/s) and “repeated triangulation and 
traverse, can a picture of” (ibid.) their authentic place in the 
world/history be built. Our article highlights that in contrast to 
supporters of genetic determinism, in psychoanalysis, the 
analysand “must be understood through their interconnection 
rather than their reduction, through their interdependence 
rather than their simplification.” (ibid.) The analysand is “on 
the way” (Malpas 2012, 4) to their homecoming when they 
understand that “No single sighting is sufficient to gain a view 
of the entire region; multiple sightings are required, and every 
sighting overlaps, to some extent, with some other sighting” 
(Malpas 1999b, 41). Finally, and to reiterate, the analysand’s 
“delineation of place can only be undertaken by a process that 
encompasses a variety of sightings from a number of conceptual 
‘landmarks’ and that also undertakes a wide-ranging, criss-
crossing set of journeys over the landscape at issue-it is only 
through such journeying, sighting and resighting that place can 
be understood.” (ibid.) This investigation of place and its 
relation to psychoanalysis provides important insights which 
we plan to examine in our future research on genetic 
determinism. Our forthcoming work explores in more detail 
how place can reveal the errors of genetic determinism in 
connection to the media, education, discrimination and debates 
on genetic modification. The movie GATTACA provides us a 
vehicle and platform to achieve these aims. 
 
 
NOTES 
 
 
1 Cf. Nihilism in Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra (Gildersleeve 2016c, 
103). 
2 See Gildersleeve 2016b, 3 for how this connects with Nietzsche’s “art is 
worth more than truth”. 
3 Cf. „Hysteria and the Will to Power” in Gildersleeve 2016b. 
4 This is comparable to the journey of Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit; see 
Gildersleeve 2016b, 20-21. 
5 This equates authenticity with hysteria and the Will to Power. 
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